

HSPAMI-FRAMEWORK:

Towards Modelling and Analyzing Healthcare Staffs'
Information Security Practices

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Outline



Motivation



Current trend study
approaches



Regulatory, Legal and
standard requirements



Framework



Discussion/Conclusion



COUNTERING THE THREAT
OF CYBER ATTACKS

CYBER SECURITY

cyber security | Data breach |
Health South East RHF | Norway

Norway healthcare cyber-attack 'could be biggest of its kind'



Owen
Hughes

24 January 2018

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Related Content



The cyber-attack against Norway's largest health authority could be one of the biggest of its kind in healthcare, sources have told Digital Health News.

**About 3 million records
breached (half the total
population of Norway)**

**Insider aid(whether
deliberate or not)**

**Citizens humble inquiry:
“Are hospitals providing
adequate protection to our
sensitive data ”**



Why is
healthcare
data the
target?



According to ISO 27799:2016



Healthcare organizations usually collect detailed personal information due to the ultimate importance to perfectly identify patients and correctly match them to their health records.




The detailed personal information is of great value to cybercriminals for committing identity theft.

Healthcare records Richer and More Sensitive

(Caroline Humer and J. Finkle, 2014, ISO 27799:2016)

Healthcare Sector

Banking Sector





wp.com/securityaffairs.co

Mutual Trust

Threat on

- mutual trust and confidentiality
- between healthcare and patients

(Pedersen, S. and G. Hartvigsen, 2015)



“If patients do not feel that their personal medical information will be kept confidential, they may withhold important medical information from health care providers making it difficult to provide quality and effective health care” Drye et al., 2010



More attention on tech. measures than the human firewall!


Norwegian eHealth infrastructure(Siemens-healthineers, 2018)

Overview eHealth Infrastructure Components

[Kontakt oss](#)

- security governance configuration,
- security planning and policies,
- risk management,
- And other technology controls

- Firewalls
- DMZs
- IDS/IPS
- Antivirus
- Other Technologies



Default Priority of healthcare staff- not information security

- Default setting of healthcare staffs is on healthcare delivery
- Funding in healthcare being chronically reduced leading to reduction in personnel with increased workload
- Humans- the Weakest link in the security chain



In summary



END OF ROAD???



Goal

Security Gap Analysis



Research Questions



How can the security practice of a healthcare staffs be determined?



What characteristics and security practices of healthcare staffs should be observed?



How should that be observed?



Where should that be observation?

Staffs' Characteristics Cont...

Safa, N.S., et al 2015, Yuryna et al., 2017

- Socio-demographic characteristics
 - age,
 - gender,
 - education,
 - workload level,
 - emergency situation
 - the security experience
- psycho-socio-cultural traits referred to personal behaviors that are influenced by psychological, social and cultural factors:
 - ✓ perception,
 - ✓ attitude,
 - ✓ norms
 - ✓ beliefs
 - ✓ Social Bonding
 - ✓ Peer Pressure

Security Practices

- Security Practices includes security measures being adopted by healthcare staff in their IS usage in order to prevent compromising the CIA of resources
- **Security practices:**
 - internet use,
 - email use,
 - social media use,
 - password management,
 - incident reporting,
 - information handling
 - mobile computing
 - Etc.

Literature Survey

Framework/Study	HSPAMI Study areas addressed	Approach
A conceptual framework [11]	Users perception	Qualitative, Quantitative
Framework for healthcare information assurance policy and compliance[12]	Users perception	Qualitativy
Security practices of healthcare staffs in real clinical setting.[15]	Users perception, Social Control	Survey with questionnaires
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)[16]	Users perception	Survey with questionnaires
Conceptual Framework [19]	Big data analysis	Comparison of input data with known attack signatures
Network anomaly detection sensor (SNAD)[20]	Big data analysis	Comparison of input data with established pattern
Local Outlier Factor (LOF) in Electronic Patients Records [21]	Big data analysis	KNN
Cyberattacks Against U.S. Healthcare Systems[22]	Social Engineering	Reviews of phishing attacks
Evaluation of a mandatory phishing training program for high-risk employees at a US healthcare system[24].	Social Engineering	Phishing Attack-Defense simulation
Assessment of Employee Susceptibility to Phishing Attacks at US Health Care Institutions[25]	Social Engineering	Phishing Attack-Defense simulation

Psycho-socio-cultural-Context

Theories:

- Protection Motivation Theory
- Theory of Planned Behavior
- Health Believe Model
- Social Control
- Etc



Security Practices:

- Password mgt
- phone communication Management
- Internet usage
- Email
- Disposal of sensitive info.
- Social Media usage
- Etc.

Protection Motivation Theory(PMT)



- Ability to protect oneself based on;
 - perceived severity of a threatened event,
 - perceived probability of the occurrence, or vulnerability,
 - the impact of the recommended, preventive Measure
 - perceived self-efficacy.

Social Engineering

- ▶ Observe security practice
- ▶ Develop security metric



Big data analysis

(Boddy, et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2012; Yeng et al., 2019)



Model and analyze access-related data



Determine Anomaly



Assess Anomaly to determine malice behavior



Determine and administer intervention measures

Summary of Survey

- All the studies:
 - Recognized the issues of human factors in healthcare information security
 - Contributed towards enhancing the ‘human-firewall’ to augment the technological measures
 - What is in short fall was:
 - the lack of holistic approach
 - Lack of anchorage to the desires of national and international Regulations, Laws and standards in healthcare

Need for holistic measure?

Attack-Defense without Psycho-socio-cultural metrics
and vice versa

Observational Measures (Review)

- Observational measures include observing how users respond to the security controls towards meeting security requirements of the policies ISO:27000:2018.

Observational Measures (Review)



What characteristics and security practices of healthcare staffs should be observed?



How should that be observed?



Where should that be observation?

Existing observational measuers

- The sources of measures include (Yeng et al. 2019)
 - system setting;
 - installed programs;
 - running processes;
 - online activities;
 - browser history;
 - network connections;
 - warnings;
 - file system;
 - running processes of backup task.

ISSUES WITH EXISTING OBSERTIONAL MEASURES

None of the above studies indicated their observational measures to meet the **key security lookups as provisioned in various standards and code of conducts** for healthcare security and data privacy protection in Norway


Develop Observational measures from Required Security practices in Healthcare




Regulations (GDPR, NIS Directives, HIPAA)



Laws



Standards(ISO 27002,27799:2016)



Ethics, Best Practices and Code of conducts



Security tools in healthcare(Anomaly Detection systems)



Reports on data breaches in healthcare

Relevant laws in healthcare



**The Health
Records Act,**



**The Health
Personnel Act,**



**The Personal
Health Data
Filing System Act,**



**The Health
Research Act,**



**The Patients' and
Users' Rights Act**

(Pedersen, S. and G.
Hartvigsen, 2015)

Other Regulations, Standards and Directives



**Health Insurance
Portability and
Accountability
Act**

The HIPAA privacy
rule;
the HIPAA security
rule



ISO 27799:2016



**The Hippocratic
oath required to
upheld
confidentiality of
PHI.**




**Code of Conduct
for information
security and data
protection in the
healthcare and
care services
(e.g., Norway).**




**Network and
Information
Systems (NIS) EU
Directives**

Spectrum of observational measures



How was the observational measures developed?



How was the observational measures developed? Cont...

- So, the observational measures were developed by forming an alternative hypothesis from the technical security measures.
- In this instance, the alternative hypothesis was formed as, “There are unauthorized accesses to PHI”.

How was the observational measures developed? Cont...

- The alternative hypothesis presented
 - a responsibility
 - and a challenge
- for us to explore and synthesize the observational measures for the specified security practices.

How was the observational measures developed? Cont...

- Tailed observational measures found include
 - self-authorization,
 - interorganizational accesses of PHI


How was the observational measures developed? Cont...

In addition, the following methods could be used in the assessment


- Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning
- Test scenarios (eg if the necessary and relevant PHI would be available in situations where the EHR is deemed not available)
- Statistical analysis(qualitative, quantitative)

H1	Possible causes and Related Threats	Detection/Observational Measure	Source/Logs
1. Access Control			
There are unauthorized accesses to PHI	user access misconfiguration, impersonations resulting in direct violation of patient' confidentiality, security and privacy issue on necessary and relevant accesses	Compare user access profile with current accesses. Check accesses with authorization register eg purpose, time, location, authorizer, access rights, planned therapeutic patient and schedule, quantum of authorize access, Check misuse of self-authorization and interorganizational accesses	EHR, Network log
Personnel do not have unique authentications	This can cause unauthorized accesses. Eg password sharing	Check for sharing authentication criteria, logins after shift time, and location of logins, login with default password and unique user computer behavior such as keystrokes and mouse clicks dynamics. Psycho-socio-cultural measures	HER
2. Employees, competence and attitude-forming campaigns			
PHI is disclosed through the usage of e-mail, text or other unencrypted channels	It compromises the right of patients to confidentiality	Use content filtering to scan email text, images and attachments, for potential threats. Test to get PHI and user credentials via social engineering and phasing attacks	HER/ Attack-Defense scenario
4. Physical security and the handling of equipment			
Not all personnel obtain keys/access/cards/password through known procedures	Unauthorized persons can have Keys/Access cards to computing resources	Check for abnormal physical access profile of users. Eg. Abnormal physical accesses will deviate from their established profile or pattern	Physical access log
7. ICT Readiness			
Shutdown of EHR will cause non-availability of essential PHI	Non-available essential PHI will result in a range of incorrect patient treatment to loss of lives	Test for the availability of essential PHI in electronic information system shutdown scenarios/Qualitative Study	

Study Structure





Overview of HSPAMI Study Cycle



Security Practices:

- Password mgt
- phone communication Management
- Internet usage
- Email
- Disposal of sensitive info.
- Social Media usage
- Etc.

Proposed framework



Conclusion



Comprehensive framework was proposed towards modeling and analyzing healthcare staffs' security practices



The framework was based on mandated security conducts combined with standards which are most specific to healthcare information security.

Conclusion cont...

- These standards and code of conducts, are measured up to global standards, legal and regulatory requirement which are being revived to improve upon their vitality for healthcare security counter measures

Conclusion Cont...

Conscious care security practices could be inculcated onto our busy, weakest link in the security chain(healthcare staffs) with HSPAMI framework

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Thank You For Your Attention!

Questions?

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